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The countries that comprise the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)—
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have 
become attractive cyber-attack targets thanks to their oil-fueled prosperity, liquid capital, and 
geopolitical and cultural positions. These cyber-threats and the GCC’s responses, resources, and 
capabilities have significant global implications. For example, the 2012 attacks on Saudi 
Arabia’s state-owned oil company, Aramco, had significant influence on the Pentagon’s 
decision to drastically expand its own cybersecurity (CS) force in the U.S. Cyber Command. 
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This and numerous other high-profile attacks have intensified efforts by GCC nations to 
strengthen CS, with many placing it at the forefront of their security agendas. Qatar, for one, 
has made CS one of its three priority challenges, along with energy and water security, and has 
also established a Cybercrime Investigation Center and an Information Security Center. The 
UAE, for another, announced last year that it would double its security spending over the next 
ten years, with the majority going to CS. These regulations have been shaped by a variety of 
factors, including Sharia principles, a drive toward economic modernization, and an increasingly 
international geopolitical orientation. 
 
The United States’ and other Western nations’ interest in the GCC countries’ CS initiatives also 
is growing as their services become increasingly important in intelligence gathering and 
information sharing. This is particularly true for hot-button issues in the Middle East, including 
Iranian arms developments. Private CS firms are also gaining interest because of the new market 
opportunities opening up in the wake of the aforementioned recent cyber-attacks. 
 
Threats, Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Challenges 
 
The GCC economies’ efforts to improve CS are significantly hindered by a lack of resources, 
experience, and training in their criminal justice and law enforcement systems. Saudi Arabia 
serves as an illustrative case in point. In order to effectively protect itself, based on the size and 
structure of its economy, Saudi Arabia would need to train 3,000 CS experts and provide basic 
skills instruction to tens of thousands more.[1] Similarly, a cybercrime seminar organized by 
Oman’s state-run Informational Technology Authority (ITA) recommended that several judges 
and the much of the Royal Oman Police would have to be trained in cybercrime cases. 
 
Despite these capacity-building challenges, the GCC economies’ attempts to modernize their 
natural gas and petrochemical industries involve significant investment in computing platforms, 
making CS a key security concern. The attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, which have been 
attributed to a virus called Shamoon, wiped out the hard drives of 30,000 computers—85 percent 
of the oil giant’s devices—and shut down the company's business for two weeks at a cost of over 
U.S. $15 million. Several months later, the Shamoon malware attacked again in an attempt to 
disrupt international supply flows. Since Aramco is a state-owned company, these cyber-attacks 
can arguably be considered attacks against Saudi Arabia itself. This problem extends beyond 
Saudi Arabia: the same month Shamoon was attacked the second time, Qatar’s liquid natural gas 
company, RasGas, experienced cyber-attacks associated with the same virus, shutting down its 
website and computer servers. According to U.S. officials and Middle Eastern private sources 
alike have attributed the attacks on Aramco and RasGas on the Iranian government.[2] The 
attacks took place shortly after Saudi Arabia expressed its intention to increase oil production to 
counter any supply problems caused by sanctions on Iran. 
 
Regulations and Strategies 
 
The GCC states contain a number of free zones with more developed guidelines and regulations 
for data protection. For instance, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) has its own 
legal system and courts with jurisdiction over corporate, commercial, civil, employment, and 
trust matters. Another free zone is Dubai Healthcare City (DHC), which provides medical 
services. Likewise, the Qatar Financial Center (QFC), which was established to attract 
international financial services, follows legal structure based on English common law. These free 
zones have enacted data protection laws modeled after the European Union’s data protection 
directive to regulate the processing, storage, and transfer of personal data. 
 
Understanding why non-free zones have such lax regulations, however, necessitates 
understanding Sharia law’s effect on privacy. It is against Sharia principles to invade an 
individual’s privacy and disclose secrets without his or her permission, especially if it is not in 
the public interest to do so. Thus, constitutions in GCC countries tend to hold an individual’s 
right to privacy sacred. The Saudi Arabian constitution, for example, guarantees the privacy of 
telephonic, telegraphic, postal and other forms of communications, and prohibits surveillance or 
eavesdropping on them. The Saudi 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law created civil and criminal 
sanctions for violations of personal data privacy, including the interception of data transmitted 
through information networks and the unauthorized access of financial data. 
 
Another complication is that legal and law-enforcement structures within GCC countries have 
been designed primarily to tackle internal threats against their rulers. In 2012, Reporters Without 
Borders named both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia “The Enemies of the Internet.” According to its 
report, these countries “combine often drastic content filtering with access restrictions, tracking 
of cyber-dissidents and online propaganda.” Observers have noted that Saudi Arabia’s 
crackdown against online activists has reached “extremely worrying levels.” Human rights 
defenders face threats, harassment, arbitrary detention, imprisonment, torture, and fabricated 
judicial proceedings levied against them. In July 2014, Saudi human rights activist Waleed 
Abulkhair was sentenced to 15 years in prison, fined a large sum of money, and banned from 
leaving the country for 30 years after making comments on social media and remarks to the news 
media about the country’s miserable human rights record. In June 2013, the Saudi government 
banned Viber, an app that lets users call, send messages, and share photos with each other. In 
2006, Google Translate and Wikipedia were blocked. 
 
Indeed, a unique feature of the GCC states’ cyber landscape is the prevalence of religion in their 
CS strategies. In 2010, Saudi Arabia’s Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention 
of Vice (the Haia) announced that it would establish a unit to fight cybercrimes. The Haia’s 
initial focus was the online blackmail of women. A 2002 study conducted by Harvard Law 
School found that proxy serves in Saudi Arabia filtered and blocked sexually explicit content. In 
2013, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) blocked 
about 400,000 pornographic sites. In August of 2014, the Haia asked the Ministry of Interior to 
arrest cyber-offenders who insult Allah, which is unspecific enough that the ministry can use this 
power almost indiscriminately. 
 
Organizations in GCC countries have also taken measures to strengthen CS. Saudi governmental 
bodies like the Capital Markets Authority and the Riyadh city government have launched in-
house or contracted efforts to protect data. Some organizations are building their own CS teams 
instead of outsourcing to third parties. Following the 2012 attacks, Aramco moved its outsourced 
IT services in-house. Likewise, the Saudi Electric Company (SEC) has placed special emphasis 
on CS for its electricity-generating systems. Not long ago, the SEC viewed the production side as 
a separate, closed system rather than as outward-facing. In revising this traditional view, the 
company was acknowledging that production is also exposed to cyber-threats. 
 
Finally, GCC countries’ CS measures have been considerably influenced by external actors. The 
United States is reportedly providing GCC states with cyber-attack defense assistance, especially 
those that provide intelligence about Iranian arms in return. So far, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
Bahrain are believed to have received such help. Bahrain also worked with the U.S. Department 
of Defense to develop civilian and military CS capabilities. Oman’s Electronic Transactions Law 
and Qatar’s Electronic Commerce and Transactions Law both draw on the UN Model Law on 




GCC states are taking measures to strengthen CS, especially in free trade zones and key 
economic sectors. Capacity-building efforts, including CS skill development and enhancing 
educational awareness at various levels, need to be designed with the aim of enhancing cyber-
defense capabilities. 
 
In order to tackle internal CS threats, GCC states are taking measures to increase political 
authority and governing capacity. Cultural and sociopolitical factors also play key roles in GCC 
economies’ cyber crime-fighting initiatives. In the absence of comprehensive laws, courts’ 
judgments may be influenced by Sharia. Because they fall under individual judges’ discretion, 
the punishment for data breach-related crimes are likely to be unpredictable and 
unclear.  Ultimately, the lack of pan-GCC laws means that foreign businesses operating in the 
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